FEMA versus local governments: Influence and reliance in disaster preparedness by Sadiq, Abdul-Akeem et al.
 
 
This is the author's manuscript of the article published in final edited form as:   
 
Sadiq, A.-A., Tharp, K., & Graham, J. D. (2016). FEMA versus local governments: influence and reliance in 
disaster preparedness. Natural Hazards, http://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2183-6  
FEMA versus Local Governments: Influence and Reliance in Disaster Preparedness 
 
 
 
Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, PhD (Corresponding Author) 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
801 West Michigan Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202 
(317) 278-1013 
asadiq@iupui.edu 
 
 
Kevin Tharp  
Indiana University Center for Survey Research 
 
 
John D. Graham, PhD 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs 
Indiana University 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether disaster information sourced to 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) influences intentions to adopt hazard 
adjustments. Survey questions are also used to determine whether individuals rely more on 
FEMA or local governments when preparing for disasters. Using an online sample of 2008 US 
employees, the results indicate that information sourced to FEMA is no more influential than 
information sourced to local governments and that individuals rely less on FEMA than on local 
agencies during disaster preparedness. These results have significant implications for practice 
and future research on natural hazard preparedness. 
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1 Introduction 
Organizations are expected to adopt preparedness measures, such as obtaining disaster 
information, in order to be ready for natural disasters (Huss et al. 2012). In this study, disaster 
information is any piece of hazard adjustment information that can help to reduce the impacts of 
natural disasters on organizations. Hazard adjustments are “… actions that intentionally or 
unintentionally reduce risk from extreme events in the natural environment” (Lindell and Perry 
2000: 461-462). While there are many sources of disaster information—state and local agencies, 
news media, businesses, nonprofits, and educational and research institutions (Henstra 2010; 
Huss et al. 2012)—this study focuses on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
a key source of disaster information and an important United States federal agency for disaster 
preparedness.  
Previous studies have established a positive relationship between disaster information and 
the adoption of hazard adjustments at the individual and organizational levels (Basolo et al. 
2009; Huss et al. 2012; Perry and Nigg 1985). This study builds on this literature by using social 
influence theory (Asch 1955; Deutsch and Gerard 1955) to explore whether FEMA is an 
influential provider of disaster information. In this study, influence is the use of persuasive 
power to change the behavior of others (Carlson et al. 2000; Levi 2007). Social psychologists 
have examined the concept of social influence in great detail, but the topic of influence has not 
received much attention from natural hazards scholars despite its relevance to decision-making 
(Jensen 2007; Magee and Frasier 2014).  
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This study contributes to the body of literature on public agency influence in the context 
of disaster preparedness by examining a first research question: Is FEMA an influential source of 
disaster information? A better understanding of whether FEMA is an influential source of 
disaster information could have broad implications for future inquiries into FEMA’s role and 
performance in emergency management. If FEMA is not influential, steps may need to be taken 
to build public trust in the agency or rechannel FEMA’s activities to the backstage where, instead 
of dealing directly with the public, they funnel authoritative disaster information through state 
and local agencies.  
One of FEMA’s myriad goals is to help the United States prepare for natural disasters, 
serving as the lead agency in this arena. In order for FEMA to perform this preparedness 
function, the public must perceive FEMA as a specialty expert organization that they can rely on 
for disaster preparedness. No study to our knowledge has studied whether or not individuals rely 
on FEMA for disaster preparedness to a greater extent than county/city emergency management 
agencies. Hence, we examine a second research question: Do individuals rely more on FEMA or 
county/city emergency management agencies when preparing for natural disasters? 
A key limitation of previous research on organizational preparedness has been how to 
obtain accurate information about an organization’s readiness (Sadiq and Weible 2010). There 
have been dozens of employer-based surveys that purport to assess readiness, but their results are 
questionable because sample sizes are small, response rates are uneven, and it is difficult to 
establish standardization in who responds to the survey (executives, information technology 
professionals, human resources personnel, and so forth) (Han and Nigg 2011; Sadiq and Weible 
2010). More importantly, such surveys are susceptible to a response bias, as employers may be 
reluctant to acknowledge that they are unprepared or are devoting insufficient resources to 
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disaster preparedness or are not relying on the most authoritative sources of information about 
natural disasters (FEMA 2011; Fowler et al. 2007).   
The following background section discusses the origin of FEMA, and the subsequent 
section examines the literature on three related issues: the relationship between disaster 
information and hazard adjustments, how and where citizens seek disaster information, and the 
concept of public agency influence. The research design and methodology, including data 
collection and analysis, follows the literature review. A discussion of the results follows. The 
study concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research findings for practice and 
future scholarship in hazard research. 
2 Background 
2.1 Origins of FEMA 
Emergency management agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government are 
charged with the responsibility of protecting communities against disasters (Giuffrida 1985; 
McLoughlin 1985). At the federal level, FEMA is the lead agency for protecting and preserving 
the lives and properties of American citizens (Giuffrida 1985; May 1985; Sadiq 2009). Part of 
FEMA’s role is to encourage state and local governments, private entities, and non-volunteer 
organizations to mitigate and prepare for disasters. FEMA also coordinates these parties during 
disaster response and recovery (Comfort et al. 2010). In short, FEMA plays a significant role in 
the four phases of emergency management cycle: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Mitigation is any action aimed at preventing disasters from occurring or reducing the 
consequences of disasters when they occur (Kapucu et al. 2010; McLoughlin 1985). 
Preparedness entails carrying out activities in readiness for disasters. Response consists of 
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actions taken in the immediate aftermath of disasters to prevent further loss of life and property 
damage. Finally, recovery involves carrying out activities that can help to restore the functioning 
of a disaster-stricken community. 
FEMA was created through the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 (Federal Register n.d.) 
and President Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order 12127 on April 1, 1979, puts the reorganization 
plan into effect (Fugate 2014). The creation of FEMA was in response to a widespread belief that 
the management of disasters pre-FEMA was unorganized (May 1985). During its infancy, 
FEMA was neglected with respect to funding and official attention and was often staffed with 
political appointees devoid of emergency management experience (Comfort et al. 2012). These 
problems, among others, led to poor responses to disasters, such as Hurricane Hugo and the 
Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Comfort et al. 2012). Against 
this backdrop of poor FEMA responses, Congress contemplated disassembling FEMA during a 
reauthorization hearing in 1992 (Comfort et al. 2012). In 1993, President Bill Clinton brought in 
an experienced emergency manager, James Lee Witt, to head FEMA (Comfort et al. 2012). The 
reign of James Lee Witt became known as the Golden Age of FEMA, as Witt instilled a culture 
of transparency and openness at the agency and established close ties with state and local 
governments through FEMA’s ten regional offices (Comfort et al. 2012).  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Act was passed in 2002 (Comfort, 
et al. 2010), establishing the new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under 
which FEMA and 21 other agencies were subsumed (Col 2007). Instead of reporting directly to 
the President of the United States, as was previously the case, the FEMA Director started 
reporting to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. After FEMA became part of 
DHS, the agency began to suffer from diminished funding and capacity to respond to natural 
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disasters (Adamski et al. 2006; Gerber 2007; Waugh 2007). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina 
devastated the Gulf Coast and exposed the weaknesses in the new post 9/11 emergency 
management structure. In order to improve the emergency management system, Congress passed 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006 (Comfort et al. 
2010). Among other changes, this act retained FEMA in DHS, but assigned greater independence 
to FEMA (e.g., the DHS secretary cannot reorganize FEMA) and made preparedness, response, 
and recovery a larger part of what FEMA does (Comfort et al. 2010). 
2.2 The relationship between disaster information and hazard adjustments 
Hazard adjustments apply to all four phases of emergency management, but our focus is on the 
preparedness phase, where adjustments are implemented before a disaster occurs (e.g., issuing 
warnings prior to an imminent disaster) (Lindell and Perry 2000). The importance of hazard 
adjustments in any community cannot be overemphasized because hazard adjustments can help 
to enhance community resilience to disasters (Sadiq 2011).  
Hazard adjustment intention in this study means the perceived willingness of an 
organization to adopt hazard adjustments. This can be contrasted with actual hazard adjustments, 
which are adjustments that have been adopted. Although previous studies have focused on 
hazard adjustment intentions at the household level (e.g., in the context of earthquake hazard) 
(Davis 1989), we are aware of no study that has examined the relationship between disaster 
information and the hazard adjustment intentions of organizations in multiple disaster contexts. 
Previous research has established a positive relationship between the provision of disaster 
information and the adoption of hazard adjustments at the individual and organizational levels 
(Basolo et al. 2009; Huss et al. 2012; Perry and Nigg 1985; Sadiq and Weible 2010). We are 
7 
 
particularly interested in studies that examined this relationship at the organizational level. Huss 
et al. (2012) studied trust, information, and preparedness using information from 227 
organizations in Memphis, Tennessee. They found, among other results, a significant and 
positive relationship between disaster information received from Memphis city government and 
preparedness. Sadiq and Weible (2010) examined the relationship between organizational 
obstacles and disaster risk reduction among Memphis, Tennessee organizations. One of their 
results was that a lack of disaster information is a significant obstacle to risk reduction in 
organizations.  
2.3 How and where citizens seek disaster information 
The provision of timely and accurate disaster information can help ameliorate the consequences 
of disasters (Huss et al. 2012). This is one reason why public agencies at the federal, state, and 
local levels provide disaster information to citizens and organizations in all four phases of the 
emergency management cycle (McLoughlin 1985). For example, in the preparedness phase, 
FEMA can issue warnings to communities about an impending disaster such as a hurricane that 
is about to make landfall. Traditionally, the public has relied on emergency management officials 
and news media to provide them with disaster information (Hughes and Palen 2012). More 
recently, communities and the citizenry have begun to seek disaster information from websites 
managed by federal agencies, such as FEMA and the National Weather Service, and those 
maintained by state and local emergency management agencies (Hwang et al. 2002). FEMA 
alone provides over 100 links on its website on disaster preparation for citizens and organizations 
(Kahan 2015).  
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In recent years, social media are becoming a major medium for disseminating disaster 
information due to the ease of accessibility, depth of information provided, and the speed at 
which information can be distributed and retrieved (Hughes and Palen 2012). As a result, FEMA 
has begun to use social media to disseminate disaster information and increase disaster 
awareness among the public (Kahan 2015). In addition to social media and the Internet, FEMA’s 
Office of Public Affairs supplies information to the public through print and electronic media.  
As information flows from FEMA to state and local governments and the public, FEMA must be 
seen as credible in order for the target audiences to receive and share the information with others 
(Egnoto et al. 2013). In other words, the degree of information diffusion is contingent on the 
credibility of the source. 
2.4 The concept of agency influence 
Among all of the social sciences, social psychologists may have examined social influence in the 
greatest detail (Asch 1955; Deutsch and Gerard 1955). Social influence can be defined as the 
“attempts to affect or change other people” (Levi 2007: 127). Asch’s (1955) series of 
experiments on conformity provides a foundation for understanding group influence on 
individuals. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) studied the relationship between two types of social 
influence-normative and informational-on individual judgment. Normative influence is when 
individuals change their behavior in order to meet the expectations set by others and are in turn 
welcomed by others, while information influence has to do with the acceptance of information 
from others in a well-defined situation (Levi 2007). Using an experimental approach, Deutsch 
and Gerard (1955) found that, in the absence of normative social influence, subjects made more 
errors when they were part of an experimental group than when they were alone. This result 
suggests that a group can exert influence on the behaviors of individuals.  
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The concept of social influence provides a conceptual basis for the three hypotheses 
below. Whereas social influence is often applied to understand the behavior of an individual, 
here we posit the influence occurring within an organizational context. The assumption is that 
FEMA, a federal agency, will use information influence to affect the behavioral intentions of 
organizations to adopt hazard adjustments (Gladwin et al. 2002; Levi 2007). 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between the warning based on information 
from FEMA and the adoption of fewer than the recommended measures.  
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the warning based on information from 
FEMA and the adoption of all the recommended measures.  
H3: There will be a positive relationship between the warning based on information from 
FEMA and the adoption of more than the recommended measures. 
Among the three levels of government in the United States, local governments are the 
closest to citizens and the most trusted (Pew 2013). The result of a public opinion survey 
conducted in 2013 by the Pew Research Center indicates that 63 percent of the public have a 
favorable view of local governments compared to just 28 percent for the federal government 
(Pew 2013). Local emergency management agencies, in particular, have been found to be trusted 
sources of disaster information for citizens (Schmalzried et al. 2011). The propinquity of local 
governments to their citizens allows citizens to mount pressure on local agencies to be 
accountable for emergency management decisions (French 2011). Indeed, when citizens perceive 
local emergency management agencies to be trusted sources of disaster information, they are 
more likely to search their websites for disaster information (Schmalzried et al. 2011). Based on 
the above literature, we offer Hypothesis 4. 
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H4: Citizens will rely more on their county/city emergency management agencies than on 
FEMA when preparing for natural disasters.  
3 Data Collection 
We considered three modes for subject recruitment and survey administration: the random-digit 
dial (RDD), the home-interview method, and the online survey. Selection criteria were cost, 
representativeness of the sample, response time, response quality, and measurement error.  
Previous research has demonstrated that the online survey, if executed properly, is equivalent or 
superior to the other methods on each criterion (Chang and Krosnick 2009; Yeager et al. 2010).  
Moreover, the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) has determined 
that, where online panels of respondents have been compared to external benchmarks such as the 
Census, representative national samples of respondents have been accomplished (Baker et al. 
2010).  Thus, we chose the online survey for administration, but included a RDD component in 
subject recruitment to avoid the selection problems that can result when subject recruitment 
occurs only through online methods. 
The authors designed the survey instrument and administered it through GfK 
(http://www.gfk.com/us/About-us/Pages/default.aspx), a survey design company. GfK is one of 
the largest global survey research organizations and has approval from the National Institute of 
Health to conduct survey research. The instrument collected information about employees’ 
perceptions of their employers’ hazard adoption intentions, respondents’ individual risk 
perceptions of hazards, respondents’ demographics, and organizational characteristics (e.g., age). 
The authors pre-tested the survey instrument with 17 individuals. The test group consisted of 
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staff and alumni of a university in the Midwestern United States. The pre-test, which was from 
December 12, 2013 to December 20, 2013 revealed some minor issues, which were corrected.  
The revised survey instrument was given to GfK for an initial pilot of 100 individuals in 
their KnowledgePanel® (http://www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/GfK-
KnowledgePanel.aspx). The KnowledgePanel® is based on a representative random sample of 
the United States population. Members of the KnowledgePanel® are recruited using random-
digit dialing and address-based sampling methods that include both households with and without 
Internet access. If the sampling selects households that have neither an Internet connection nor a 
computer, GfK provides both to them at no charge. As a result, the KnowledgePanel® provides a 
nearly complete coverage of the United States population.  
The pilot results indicated minor refinements were needed to improve clarity. After the 
refinements, GfK fielded the online survey in May 2014 to a nationally representative sample of 
10,559 United States adults, 18 years of age or older from their KnowledgePanel®. GfK sent one 
reminder to encourage participation. Of the 10,559 sample members invited to participate, 5079 
responded. These 5,079 responders were then screened based on two eligibility criteria: 1) 
currently working as a paid employee for an employer other than themselves, and 2) not 
currently telecommuting for the majority of their work time. We focus on these two eligibility 
criteria because employees that work for an employer and report to work on a day-to-day basis 
are in the best position to provide information about the preparedness activities at the facility 
where they report for work. A total of 2026 respondents passed the eligibility screening and 
completed the survey.  
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Eighteen respondents were removed from the sample due to short survey completion 
times (less than five minutes). Using survey completion time to identify speeders who may have 
completed the survey without reading and carefully answering the items is a common technique 
in survey research (Olson and Parkhurst 2013).  A review of these cases showed that 17 
respondents either failed to answer the items after the initial section on demographic questions or 
exhibited ‘straight-lining’ (answering several sequential items with the same response). Another 
case was removed when a review of the open comments indicated that the respondent was a full-
time telecommuter and therefore ineligible for the survey. With these exclusions, the final 
sample size is 2008. The response rate for this survey is 48 percent, using the guidelines 
established by AAPOR (www.aapor.org/Standard_Definitions2.htm#.U9fLRvldU1c).1 GfK 
weighted the data to account for unequal probabilities of selection as well as to ensure that the 
data are as close as possible to Current Population Survey estimates for the United States 
population vis-à-vis demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, marital status, race/ethnicity, 
household size, household income, etc.).  
To the best of our knowledge, the data used for this study come from a survey that is 
unique in two respects. First, it is the largest survey of natural disaster preparedness among 
public, private, and nonprofit organizations conducted to date. Second, it is one of only a few 
surveys to gather information anonymously from a national sample of employees about their 
employer’s level of preparedness for natural disasters.2 Our approach is novel in that we 
                                                          
1 AAPOR’s Response Rate 3, or RR3, was used, and calculated by dividing the 2008 interviews 
by the sum of 2026 known eligible cases plus 2192 estimated eligible cases among the 5480 who 
did not respond to the survey invitations (assuming an estimated eligibility rate of 40 percent, 
based on the eligibility rate of the 5079 responders). 
2 The other known studies that took the employee approach are Fowler et al. (2007) and Larson 
and Fowler (2009). 
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surveyed employees instead of the leaders of organizations, as is typically the case in previous 
studies. For example, Sadiq and Weible (2010) surveyed owners and risk managers of 
organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee, while Han and Nigg (2011) surveyed 
business owners in Santa Cruz County, California.  
3.1 Research design 
An experimental design was used to test the validity of the above hypotheses (Maxfield and 
Babbie 2015). In this study, the dependent variable is employee perception of his or her 
employer’s intention to adopt hazard adjustments and the independent variable is FEMA’s 
influence as a disaster information source. We presented the scenario below to the 2,008 
respondents in the sample.   
Now think about a scenario that might happen in the future. Suppose that the local 
government in your area issues a warning that natural disasters are more likely than 
previously known to impact the area where you report to work.  
[This warning is based on information from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA)].  
Your employer has been urged to take a variety of measures to reduce the impact of the 
disaster on your organization. These measures will be costly to your organization. Please 
indicate how your employer would respond using the three-point scale below. 
 a. My employer is likely to do fewer than all of the recommended measures. 
b. My employer is likely to do all of the recommended measures. 
c. My employer is likely to do more than all of the recommended measures. 
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The computer randomly assigned the respondents into two groups: the treatment (with 
FEMA) group and the control (without FEMA) group. The treatment group was given the above 
scenario in its entirety and the control group received the same scenario without the FEMA 
mention in square brackets.  
With regard to the second research question, we are interested in knowing whether 
employees rely on FEMA as opposed to county/city emergency management agencies when 
preparing for an imminent natural disaster. Specifically, the following hypothetical scenario was 
posed to all respondents:   
Suppose a major natural disaster was predicted to impact the area where you live. To 
what extent would you rely on each of the following organizations or groups to help you 
prepare for the natural disaster? 
The respondents were presented with this list of organizations and groups: American Red 
Cross, County/City Emergency Management Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Friends and Family, Fire Departments, Local Religious Organizations (e.g., churches, 
synagogues, and mosques), State Emergency Management Agency, Police Departments, and 
Colleges and Universities. The response options were on a 5-point Likert Scale: 1 (wouldn't rely 
on at all) to 5 (will rely on a great deal). 
We carried out difference of proportion tests to assess if there is a difference between the 
treatment group proportion and the control group proportion for each of the three response 
categories—employers were likely to do fewer, all, or more than all the recommended measures. 
The Rao-Scott Chi-Square test was used to ascertain whether there are statistically significant 
differences between the treatment and control groups with respect to the three response 
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categories. Although the Rao-Scott Chi-Square test is like the Pearson Chi-Square, the former 
has a design correction mechanism that accounts for the increase in variance as a result of 
weighting. The use of weights results in a penalty in the cell, making it harder to detect 
differences compared to unweighted data. Nonetheless, the Rao-Scott Chi-Square test is more 
appropriate for our data than the Pearson Chi-Square test. Finally, we carried out a series of t-
tests to ascertain whether there is a statistically significant difference between reliance on FEMA 
and other organizations or groups, including county/city emergency management agencies.  
4 Results 
Table 1 Sample Demographic Statistics (Weighted Sample).  
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 2008 41.81 13.853 18 86 
Race/Ethnicity: White, Non-Hispanic 2008 .69 .463 0 1 
Education: Bachelor’s degree 2008 .22 .418 0 1 
Gender: Male 2008 .53 .499 0 1 
Household Head: Yes 2008 .80 .397 0 1 
Household Size 2008 2.73 1.404 1 10 
Housing Type: A one-family house 
detached 
 
2008 
 
.67 
 
.469 
 
0 
 
1 
Household Income: $100,000 to $124,999  
2008 
 
.14 
 
.352 
 
0 
 
1 
Marital Status: Married 2008 .52 .500 0 1 
MSA Status: Metro 2008 .85 .356 0 1 
Region: South 2008 .35 .477 0 1 
Ownership Status of Living Quarters: 
Owned or being bought by someone in 
household 
 
 
2008 
 
 
.72 
 
 
.450 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
HH Internet Access: Yes 2008 .86 .345 0 1 
Health Sector 1831 .15 .010 0 1 
Education Sector 1831 .12 .010 0 1 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 1831 .12 .010 0 1 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Sector 1831 .07 .010 0 1 
 
According to table 1, the average age of respondents in the sample is approximately 42 
years, and 69 percent of the respondents are white (non-Hispanic). In addition, 22 percent have a 
bachelor’s degree, 53 percent are men, and 80 percent are household heads. The average 
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household size is about 3 people, 67 percent of the respondents live in detached one-family 
houses, and 14 percent has a household income between $100,000 and $124, 999. Finally, 52 
percent of the respondents are married, 85 percent live in Metro areas, 35 percent are from the 
southern part of the United States, 72 percent own their living quarters or their living quarters are 
being bought by someone in their households, and 86 percent have Internet access. With regard 
to organizational sector, 15 percent belong to the health sector, 12 percent belong to the 
educational sector, another 12 percent comprise of organizations from the wholesale/retail sector, 
and 7 percent belong to the finance/insurance/real estate sector.3 A comparison test between the 
demographic variables for the two randomized groups did not reveal a significant difference at 
the 5 percent level of significance, suggesting that the randomization to the experimental groups 
was effective.   
Table 2 Results of the Difference in Proportion Tests for the Three Response Categories 
(Weighted Sample). 
   N Mean  Robust Se z p-value  95% CI 
My employer is likely to do fewer than all of the recommended measures 
Treatment Group 312 .312  .018     .277—.346 
Control Group  266 .279  .018     .243—.314 
Difference   .033  .025              -.016—.0782  
        1.60 .110 
My employer is likely to do all of the recommended measures 
Treatment Group 498 .498  .019     .461—.536 
Control Group  524 .550  .020     .511—.590 
Difference   -.044  .023  -1.89 .059                  -.090—.002 
        
My employer is likely to do more than all of the recommended measures 
Treatment Group 190 .190  .012     .166—.214 
Control Group  163 .171  .012     .147—.195 
Difference   .022  .025  .89 .373             -.027—.071 
 
Treatment Group 1000 
Control Group  953 
 
Total Respondents 1953 
                                                          
3 We presented information on the major organizational sectors only.  
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4.1 Reaction to disaster information sourced to FEMA 
The goal of the experiment is to determine whether a disaster warning that is sourced to FEMA 
is influential to organizations, at least in the eyes of employees of the organization. In a sense, 
this is an experimental test of whether FEMA is an influential public agency relative to local 
governments. In table 2, responses for the two groups are categorized by whether respondents 
said their employers were likely to do fewer than all, all, or more than all of the recommended 
measures.  
The results in table 2 indicate that there are no significant differences in proportions 
between the control group and the treatment group for the three response categories (5 percent 
level). The results of the Rao-Scott Chi-Square test in table 3 support those in table 2 and 
indicate that there are no significant differences between the treatment and control groups for all 
three response categories (5 percent level). In short, neither the differences in proportion tests nor 
the Rao-Scott Chi-Square tests provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 1, 2 or 3. 
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Table 3 Results of the Rao-Scott Chi-Square for the Three Response Categories (Weighted 
Sample). 
 
Groups  Weighted 
Frequency 
Percent 
Distribution 
0 (Control Group) Employer likely to do fewer than all 
recommended measures 
266 27.9 
  Employer likely to do all recommended 
measures 
524 55.0 
  Employer likely to do more than all 
recommended measures 
163 17.1 
  Total 953 100 
1 (Treatment Group) Employer likely to do fewer than all 
recommended measures 
312 31.2 
  Employer likely to do all recommended 
measures 
498 49.8 
  Employer likely to do more than all 
recommended measures 
190 19.0 
  Total 1000 100 
Total Employer likely to do fewer than all 
recommended measures 
578 29.6 
  Employer likely to do all recommended 
measures 
1022 52.3 
  Employer likely to do more than all 
recommended measures 
353 18.1 
  Total 1953 100 
Rao-Scott Chi-
Square Test 
     
Pearson Chi-Square 5.3743    
Design Correction 1.5228    
Rao-Scott Chi-Square 3.5291    
DF 2    
Pr > ChiSq .1713    
Sample Size = 1969      
 
4.2 Organizations or groups relied upon for natural disaster preparedness  
Table 4 indicates that 20.7 percent of the respondents said they would not rely on FEMA at all to 
prepare for an impending disaster. Only local religious organizations (32.7 percent) and colleges 
and universities (50.7 percent) recorded higher percentages of no reliance. In addition, 10.9 
percent of respondents said they would rely on FEMA a great deal. This percentage is relatively 
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small compared to those of friends and families (39.2 percent), fire departments (24.1 percent), 
police departments (20.2 percent), American Red Cross (17.5 percent), and county/city 
emergency management agencies (16.6 percent), and only higher than those of local religious 
organizations (10.1 percent) and colleges and universities (2.7 percent). In addition, table 4 
shows that respondents’ mean reliance on county/city emergency management agencies (3.13) is 
higher than that for FEMA (2.80). In fact, FEMA ranks lower than all the groups except local 
religious organizations (2.50) and colleges and universities (1.88).  
Table 4 Reliance on Organizations or Groups for Disaster Preparedness (Weighted Sample) 
(N=1966). 
 
 Agency/Organization Would not 
rely on at 
all 
1 (%) 
 
 
 
2 (%) 
 
 
 
3 (%) 
 
 
 
4 (%) 
Would rely 
on a great 
deal 
5 (%) 
Mean 
Reliance 
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
(FEMA) 
20.7 19.0 30.8 18.5 10.9 2.8 
County/City Emergency 
Management Agency  
14.5 13.7 32.8 22.4 16.6 3.1 
Friends and Family 4.5 7.5 21.7 27.1 39.2 3.9 
Fire Departments 11.0 10.2 27.0 27.6 24.1 3.4 
Police Departments 13.1 12.9 29.0 24.8 20.2 3.3 
American Red Cross 14.4 15.4 29.6 23.1 17.5 3.1 
State Emergency 
Management Agency 
15.3 15.7 32.7 22.0 14.2 3.0 
Local Religious 
Organizations (e.g., 
churches, synagogues, and 
mosques) 
32.7 17.8 26.1 13.4 10.1 2.5 
Colleges and Universities 50.7 20.9 21.3 4.5 2.7 1.9 
  
In table 5, the results from several t-tests show that respondents are more likely to rely on 
their county/city emergency management agencies than on FEMA. In addition, the results 
indicate that FEMA ranks lower than fire departments, police departments, and state emergency 
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management agencies; and higher than local religious organizations and colleges and 
universities. In sum, the t-test results corroborate those of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 5 Reliance T-test Results: FEMA Vs. other Organizations or Groups (Weighted Sample). 
 Other Organizations or Groups N Mean 
Difference 
Std. Err. t-stat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FEMA vs 
 
 
County/City Emergency 
Management Agency 
 
 
 
1957 
 
 
 
-.34 
 
 
 
.02 
 
 
 
-14.2*** 
 
 
Friends and Family 
 
 
1961 
 
 
-1.09 
 
 
.03 
 
 
-32.4*** 
 
Fire Departments 
 
1956 
 
-.65 
 
.03 
 
-24.7*** 
 
Police Departments 
 
1965 
 
-.47 
 
.03 
 
-18.0*** 
 
American Red Cross 
 
1961 
 
-.35 
 
.02 
 
-14.2*** 
 
 
Colleges and Universities 
 
 
1949 
 
 
.92 
 
 
.03 
 
 
31.0*** 
 
 
 
Local Religious Organizations 
 
 
 
1963 
 
 
 
.29 
 
 
 
.03 
 
 
 
8.5*** 
State Emergency Management 
Agency 
 
1961 
 
-.24 
 
.02 
 
-11.9*** 
***p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
5 Discussion 
This study on FEMA’s influence is closely related to the literature on the credibility of public 
agencies. As a result, we use previous work on credibility to explain the finding of no FEMA 
effect for the fewer than all, all, and less than all categories. The lack of credibility of public 
agencies might constrain collaboration between public agencies, stakeholders, and the public 
(Scholz et al. 2008), and could have a significant impact on public agencies’ performance with 
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regard to managing disasters (Egnoto et al. 2013; French 2011). Stated simply, a public 
emergency management agency lacking credibility may find it hard to persuade the public to 
heed its disaster warnings or otherwise utilize its disaster information.  
In the aftermath of Katrina, FEMA’s credibility was tarnished because of its poor 
response (Comfort et al. 2010; Kahan 2015; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006; Vogel 2012). Images 
of people stranded on rooftops, deplorable conditions in the New Orleans Superdome and the 
Convention Center, as well as reports of looting and police officers abandoning their posts, may 
have undermined FEMA’s reputation for responsiveness and competence (Adamski et al. 2006). 
As a result, it is possible that the public may not view FEMA as a credible agency and any piece 
of disaster information from FEMA will have little or no impact on an organization’s intention to 
adopt hazard adjustments. According to a public opinion survey conducted by Gallup in 2009—
in between Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy—regarding the overall customer experience 
with federal agencies (N=41,876), 40-50 percent of the public said they were satisfied with 
FEMA (the 40-50 percent represents the bottom quartile of federal agencies) (Gallup 2009). To 
put this result in perspective, 90 percent of respondents were satisfied with the National Park 
Service (Gallup 2009). Based on this perspective, FEMA may not be viewed as an influential 
source of disaster information.  
On the contrary, FEMA’s role immediately before, during, and after Superstorm Sandy is 
widely regarded as commendable. Indeed, in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, academics, 
Senators, governors, and the public believed that FEMA’s performance was good (Kahan 2015; 
Naylor 2012; Vogel 2012). For example, Joseph E. Trainor, an assistant professor with the 
Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware, noted in the Washington Post, “My 
impression is that this is a different agency [FEMA] than we’ve seen over the last decades, one 
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that post-Katrina had lost a lot of credibility” (Vogel 2012). In addition, Perry and Nigg (1985) 
argue that the visibility of an agency is a prerequisite for credibility. FEMA’s visibility during 
Superstorm Sandy through appearances on TV, radio, print media, website, and social media 
(Facebook, Twitter, etc.) may have contributed to FEMA being viewed as a credible agency by 
the public. This conclusion is supported by two Gallup polls about Americans’ satisfaction with 
what the federal government is doing in response to natural disasters (Jones and Ander 2013). 
The results of these Gallup polls, which were conducted in 2005 (after Hurricane Katrina) and 
2013 (after Superstorm Sandy), indicate that 33 percent and 75 percent of Americans, 
respectively, are satisfied with what the federal government is doing to respond to natural 
disasters (Jones and Ander 2013). It is important to note that the latter survey did not mention 
“FEMA” specifically. 
The result of our experiment is consistent with the result of the reliance analysis, which 
indicates that respondents rely more on their county/city emergency management agency than on 
FEMA.  In other words, the result of the experiment could be explained by the fact that 
respondents tend to rely on county/city information rather than information sourced to FEMA. 
Schmalzried and colleagues (2011) raise an important point: Is FEMA channeling disaster 
information through trusted sources like the local emergency management agencies because the 
public trusts such agencies? FEMA participates in a weekly Social Media in Emergency 
Management to connect, collaborate, and contribute ideas to help increase disaster awareness 
among citizens and organizations, including local governments (Kahan 2015). An interesting 
extension of our FEMA experiment would assess the intended responses of managers in county 
and city agencies. 
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Furthermore, one could argue that what matters is not the perceptions of rank-and-file 
employees of an organization, but the perceptions of the leaders/managers in the organization 
that have the responsibility for preparedness. Since we have not surveyed those individuals, it is 
possible that they might rely more on FEMA (compared to other entities) and would be more 
responsive to a disaster warning that is sourced to FEMA. Future research is needed to examine, 
anonymously, the perceptions of leaders/managers in charge of organizational preparedness. 
The results of the reliance analysis also reveal that respondents rely more on friends and 
families, fire departments, police departments, and American Red Cross than on FEMA. The 
greater reliance on American Red Cross is consistent with results of dozens of focus groups 
around the country that have been reported in the literature (Wray et al. 2006). Similarly, Huss, 
Sadiq, and Weible (2012) found that organizational representatives are more likely to rely on 
police and fire departments than on FEMA.  
6 Conclusions 
FEMA represents an important arsenal in the United States’ ability to prepare communities for 
disasters. This public agency has an extensive array of resources: websites, access to 
international, national and regional experts, ten regional offices, leaders experienced in 
emergency management (e.g., the current FEMA Director, Craig Fugate), and relatively more 
independence since the passage of PKEMRA. Despite the aforementioned and other resources at 
FEMA’s disposal, our results do not provide evidence that FEMA is a more influential source of 
disaster information in comparison to local governments. Our results indicate respondents rely 
more on their county/city emergency management agency than on FEMA when it comes to 
preparing for natural disasters. In addition respondents rely more on friends and families, fire 
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departments, police departments and, American Red Cross than on FEMA. Unless FEMA is 
effectively funneling information through these other information sources, our results are not 
optimistic regarding FEMA’s effectiveness as an information provider in the preparedness phase. 
The “funneling” strategy to city/county governments may work fine for FEMA with small-and 
medium-scale disasters. When a Katrina-scale disaster strikes and the capabilities of local and 
state governments are overwhelmed, the public will look toward the federal government for 
resources, expertise, and leadership. In that situation, FEMA would have to deal directly with the 
public. Hence, it is vital that FEMA be seen as an influential agency that people can rely on. On 
a final note, we suggest that future research should examine FEMA’s strategy for disseminating 
disaster information in the preparedness phase. 
 Another plausible explanation of our results is that perhaps, the issue is not about 
credibility, rather it is about familiarity with an agency or other entities. Some might argue that 
the reason why FEMA is not viewed as reliable as others such as friends and families, local 
governments, etc. is because there is less interaction between FEMA and the public than between 
friends and families, and local governments and the public. Unless there is a disaster, an average 
citizen will be less likely to interact with FEMA than with local governments, and friends and 
families on a regularly basis. Our study cannot confirm or disprove this explanation. Hence, we 
suggest that future studies examine the—credibility versus familiarity hypothesis further. 
This study offers methodological and practical insights that scholars and practitioners in 
the natural hazards community—both nationally and internationally—might find useful. 
Methodologically, we demonstrated the feasibility of a different way to measure organizational 
preparedness—one based on the perceptions of employees rather than the perceptions of 
organizational leaders. In addition, the use of an experimental approach helps to solve the 
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endogeneity problems that have plagued many survey-based studies. Practically, our results 
suggest that warning information meant for a general, non-specialist audience such as employees 
should be delivered by FEMA through trusted local governments. More generally, our study 
suggests that a public agency needs to pay careful attention to how it is perceived by the public, 
since adverse perceptions can have a significant deleterious impact on an agency’s ability to be 
successful in accomplishing its mission.  
Before our experimental result about FEMA is accepted by practitioners, we recommend 
that the result be replicated in a variety of contexts such as in other countries and with regard to a 
variety of specific natural hazards. Replication with leaders of organizations as well as 
employees would also be valuable. Future studies should examine, via controlled experiments, 
whether other sources of disaster warnings (e.g., the National Weather Service) are more or less 
influential than FEMA and the reasons why the public does not rely on FEMA as much as they 
rely on other entities. In addition, we urge future research to consider looking at the impacts of 
demographic and ideological characteristics on public agencies’ influence and reliance. 
Investigating these questions will be crucial in helping policymakers design policies aimed at 
increasing public reliance on FEMA for natural disaster preparedness as well as increasing 
FEMA’s influence as a disaster information source.   
In conclusion, this study provides insight into the influence of FEMA as source of 
disaster information in comparison to local governments and underscores the importance of 
understanding the influence of public agencies in charge of disaster preparedness in the United 
States and other countries, as natural disasters continue to pose a major challenge for 
communities across the globe. Natural hazards scholars in the United States and abroad should 
extend this study by examining the reasons why citizens rely on particular sources of disaster 
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information. Only then will natural hazards researchers begin to have a comprehensive 
understanding of reliance for disaster preparedness and provide a solid basis for practitioners to 
develop appropriate policies that can increase the level of disaster preparedness in specific 
communities in the United States and abroad. 
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